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This editorial accompanies 18 articles as part of a Frontiers research topic. The aim of this research
topic was to clarify the underlying mechanisms involved in mental practice of action, bringing
together evidence from a range of disciplines including cognitive neuroscience, experimental
neuropsychology, sport and movement science, clinical neuropsychology and clinical neurology.
The need to clarify the underlying mechanisms of mental practice is a pressing one. Mental practice
of action has been explored in sport psychology for several decades, with the aim to use mental
practice to improve sport performance. However, following the discovery of the mirror neuron
system (see for example, Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004), the perspective of mental practice has
changed to a rationale based on neuroscience and to research focussed on understanding the
neural processes of mental practice. Evidence that the brain simulates action has resulted in a
common understanding of “functional equivalence” (Jeannerod, 1994): the idea that the mental
representation of an action or percept in the person’s mind is the neural “equivalent” to the physical
action or actual percept. This ability to mentally represent action using the motor system allows for
action simulation, providing conscious mental rehearsal of movement (imagery), but also allows for
a common percept when observing the movements of others. Finally, in recent years, the disciplines
of clinical neuropsychology and neurology have begun to use mental rehearsal of action, or mental
practice, to produce improvements normally attributed to practicing actual movements.
At the heart of all of the research is the idea that mental practice of action uses equivalent neural
processes to those used in action execution. Of course, there is debate on what one understands
to be “equivalent,” but the common reasoning seems to be that because mental practice (motor
imagery and action observation) is functionally or neurally equivalent to actual practice, the efficacy
principle of mental practice is that the motor areas are “trained,” perhaps through Hebbian learning
“firing-rewiring.” Although the scientific foundation of this idea of action simulation is very sound
in neuroimaging research (e.g., Sharma and Baron, 2013, this issue), the link to behavioral evidence
or efficacy is currently weak. The neural correlates of mental practice are just that: correlates and
do not justify inference about function, efficacy, or critical causality. There nevertheless seems to
be reluctance in the field to address the underlying mechanisms of mental practice efficacy. This
comes maybe as no surprise. A functional equivalence rationale for mental practice is intuitive and
appealing and will therefore attract interest and funding. It is hardly in the researchers’ interest to
potentially undermine the idea by getting to the bottom of the matter.
We are now 15 or maybe 20 years into mental practice efficacy research based on the neural
equivalence premise (Jackson et al., 2001). What is apparent is that the above simple interpretation
of equivalence is not reflected in emerging data. It seems that mental practice efficacy is much
more complex than simple Hebbian learning. There may be an analogy with the development of
our understanding of the supplementary motor area (SMA) over that same time period. Initially
SMA was thought of as a simple planning neural strip, but we have since understood the operation
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that imagery and observation resonate with other motoric
processes. In that respect, a number of the studies reported
in this issue are exceptions to this rule in the way these
studies ambitiously delineate the mental practice process by for
example comparing the quasi-visual and the verbal-cognitive
element of mental practice efficacy (Saimpont et al., 2013,
this issue), or by contrasting the efficacy of different visual
perspectives in mental practice (Callow et al., 2013, this issue;
Yao et al., 2013, this issue), or by separating the impact of
active imagery and passive observation (Eaves et al., 2014,
this issue). It is an issue of concern, however, that such
experimental approaches are generally not pursued (nor funded)
as part of clinical evaluations, when now is the time to
establish the finer details of mental practice efficacy in clinical
contexts. We therefore advocate more high risk, high gain
evaluations of mental practice that can establish the real
impact of mental practice on the lives of real people in the
clinic.
Further to bringing clarity with regards to the underlying
mechanisms of mental practice, there is a real need to establish
the modes of delivery and dosage. Clinicians furthermore need
tools to make predictions of which patients will benefit and
from what types of mental practice treatment. Lack of clarity on
patient characteristics such as motor imagery ability can easily
lead to miss-use of current findings exposing a risk of clinicians
dismissing patients who they believe would not stand to benefit
from mental practice–based rehabilitation. It would be great
if we could say with some level of certainty whether a braindamaged patient has an intact ability to use and benefit from
mental practice therapies. Some authors would claim this can
be done either through subjective methods such as vividness
questionnaires, or through more objective methods such as
mental chronometry (Milner, 1986), or monitoring automatic
covert action simulation such as the cognitive hand mental
rotation task established by Parsons (1987), or the response of
the autonomic nervous system in mental practice as proposed
by Collet et al. (2013, this issue). There is pressure on the
research community to provide reliable measures of motor
imagery ability on which clinicians can base a decision whether
to provide a patient with mental practice rehabilitation. But
quite possibly we do not (yet) have reliable tools on which such
important decisions can be based. A study by de Vries et al.
(2013, this issue) documenting motor imagery ability in stroke
patients, showed that poor motor imagery ability as measured
by subjective vividness questionnaires was not associated with
poor performance also on objective imagery ability assessment. So
although vividness scores suggested the patients had poor motor
imagery, objective task performance in these stroke patients
suggested that motor imagery was in fact intact. This situation
could lead to the risk that clinicians when using only vividness
scores could dismiss patients as poor imagers and therefore
unable to benefit from mental practice-based rehabilitation, while
the patients’ imagery ability would be deemed intact if measured
in other ways. Although Lawrence et al. (2013, this issue) report
that high motor imagery vividness is associated with an increased
benefit of mental practice in novice gymnasts compared to
the lower performance gains in those with low motor imagery

of SMA to be highly complex in the way it is involved in
inhibition. For example, in studies using fMRI, motor imagery
and action observation often do not activate the primary motor
cortex (M1) because the SMA is thought to supresses the M1
activity (presumably preventing the individual from actually
executing actions). The inherent role of inhibition in mental
practice and the complexity of efficacy mechanisms still require
further research. The popular notion that anything to do with
the mirror neuron system is a simple matter of equivalence, or
similarly that in applied contexts of mental practice equivalence
is the end of the conversation, needs to change. We now need to
go beyond what we are comfortable with and challenge what we
know, even if we risk undermining the last decades of research.
There are still a lot of things that we do not know about
the mechanisms of mental practice of action. What does
each part of the brain engaged in mental practice actually
do; how do processes relate to one another; what happens
when different areas in the network are damaged? There are
indications that insufficient drive to address the fundamentals
of mental practice is starting to become a real issue of
concern. The systematic review in this issue by Braun et al.
(2013) concludes that the clinical evidence for mental practice
efficacy in neuro-rehabilitation is weakening. The reasons for
this seems to be the lack of theory-driven interventions,
conceptual confusion (what does mental practice actually entail
in practice?) and general methodological malaise including
feasibility, dose, responders/non-responders, and adherence
issues in larger scale trials that are more representative of clinical
practice. Alternatively, when neuroscience evidence is carefully
implemented in theory-driven clinical evaluation of mental
practice, this may not translate to earlier reported clinical benefit
(Ietswaart et al., 2011). Indeed, Malouin et al. (2013) in this issue
highlight significant issues with the translation of experimental
findings into clinical practice. Malouin et al.’s critical review is
constructive, however, by suggesting ways in which the value
of mental practice can be redeemed by addressing underlying
mechanisms of mental practice efficacy. They conclude that the
field must now truly put the use of mental practice to the test.
Mental practice may indeed benefit the large number of stroke
patients in neuro-rehabilitation, but unless mental practice is
truly put to the test, this application may be superseded by other
clinical innovations, for example, robotic assisted therapy. The
field needs to deliver the necessary clarity on what exactly are
the “active ingredients” of mental practice; what are the things
that do not work and are mere distractions; which complexities
play a role. Only then can we formulate effective guidance on
what mental practice should actually entail in clinical practice.
In the meantime, mental practice therapy in neuro-rehabilitation
is already currently recommended treatment in many clinical
guidelines. This current position means that we need to act fast in
order to understand the processes and benefits of mental practice
for clinical use. However, the current questionable guidance,
range of possible uses, lack of efficacy etc. will likely undermine
clinicians’ willingness to adopt the treatment in the forthcoming
years unless some clarity emerges.
Currently, much of the research effort goes to further
documenting the correlates of mental practice, i.e., the fact
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vividness, this relationship may not be a simple one suitable for
rehabilitation treatment decisions.
This research topic aimed to address confusion regarding
the concepts of imagery and observation which has hampered
the progression of mental practice research both scientifically
and in translation to clinical practice. Wondrusch and SchusterAmft (2013, this issue) remarkably point to the need to
address any confusion regarding mental practice even at a
therapeutic level. They advocate a good understanding of theory
and practice in recipients using mental practice rehabilitation
techniques by describing ways to teach stroke patients mental
practice. Other contributions in this issue broaden the concept
of mental practice in a number of ways, such as Howatson
et al.’s rationale for including the observation of one’s own
movements within the mental practice concept (Howatson
et al., 2013, this issue), Smith and Wakefield’s considerations
with regards to the timing rate of mental practice (Smith and
Wakefield, 2013, this issue), Kirsch et al.’s link between action
simulation and aesthetic experience (Kirsch et al., 2013, this
issue), Schack et al.’s novel theory of how mental practice
develops cognitive mental representation structures (Schack
et al., 2014, this issue), and importantly Vogt et al.’s meticulous
review of the evidence of why mental practice should encompass
both motor imagery and action observation (Vogt et al., 2013,
this issue).
Because neuroimaging studies provide strong evidence for
action simulation, but the link to behavioral change is perhaps
weak, we invited contributions to show that mental practice
efficacy might be driven by neuroplasticity processes evoked

by action simulation. The preliminary work by Olsson and
Lundstrom (2013, this issue) shows that successful action
anticipation, as a precursor of mental practice, appeared
associated with motor and temporal regions of the brain. Future
research needs to investigate evidence of the associations between
mental practice performance benefits and brain plasticity in the
motor network. It is possible that combination of techniques
is needed, including functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), MEG, and EEG.
In conclusion, in an attempt to build on interdisciplinary
consensus on the nature and application of mental practice,
this research topic integrated perspectives from the full range
of the disciplines involved in mental practice research. It
furthermore intentionally did not seek to limit mental practice
to a narrow interpretation of conscious mental rehearsal of
movement or motor imagery, but instead advocates to include
imitation and action observation of self or others as an
interpretation of mental practice as Action Simulation Therapy
(AST). Such an interpretation of AST mental practice is justified
in light of the evidence for neural equivalence. What the
neuroscience of neural equivalence means for our understanding
of behavior, mechanisms, and applied efficacy of mental practice,
however, needs a much more sustained research effort devoid
of complacency and supported by high-risk-high-gain research
funding. With this shared and funded research drive it will be
possible to accelerate our understanding and agreement on the
core processes of mental practice, and therefore speed up the
translation of evidence-based benefit of applied use of mental
practice in sport and clinical practice.
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